The effect of women directors on innovation activity and performance of corporate firms - evidence from China by Töpfer, Marina
Fakultät/ Zentrum/ Projekt XY
Institut/ Fachgebiet YZ
15-2018
wiso.uni-hohenheim.de
Research Area INEF
Hohenheim Discussion Papers in Business, Economics and Social Sciences
THE EFFECT OF WOMEN DIRECTORS 
ON INNOVATION ACTIVITY AND 
PERFORMANCE OF CORPORATE FIRMS 
– EVIDENCE FROM CHINA –
Marina Töpfer
University of Erlangen-Nuremberg
 
 
 
Discussion Paper 15-2018 
 
 
 
 
The Effect of Women Directors on Innovation Activity and 
Performance of Corporate Firms 
- Evidence from China - 
 
 
 
 
 
Marina Töpfer 
 
Research Area “INEF – Innovation, Entrepreneurship, and Finance” 
 
 
 
 
Download this Discussion Paper from our homepage: 
 
https://wiso.uni-hohenheim.de/papers 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ISSN 2364-2084 
 
 
 
 
Die Hohenheim Discussion Papers in Business, Economics and Social Sciences dienen der 
schnellen Verbreitung von Forschungsarbeiten der Fakultät Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaften. 
Die Beiträge liegen in alleiniger Verantwortung der Autoren und stellen nicht notwendigerweise die 
Meinung der Fakultät Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaften dar. 
 
 
   
 
 Hohenheim Discussion Papers in Business, Economics and Social Sciences are intended to make 
results of the Faculty of Business, Economics and Social Sciences research available to the public in 
order to encourage scientific discussion and suggestions for revisions. The authors are solely 
responsible for the contents which do not necessarily represent the opinion of the Faculty of Business, 
Economics and Social Sciences. 
  
The Eﬀect of Women Directors on Innovation Activity and
Performance of Corporate Firms
 Evidence from China ∗
Marina Töpfer†
University of Erlangen-Nuremberg, Germany
June 15, 2018
Abstract
This paper elaborates whether women bringing their diversity, cross-cultural awareness
and transformational leadership skills to corporate boards oﬀer strategic advantages for ﬁrms.
In the analysis the eﬀect of women in the board room on innovation activity and corporate
ﬁrm performance as well as the joint consequences of female directors and innovation activity
on the ﬁrm's success are examined. The latter may be particularly important in the context
of gender diversity as more gender-diverse boards allow for higher levels of creativity and
hence innovation. In order to account for endogeneity issues, diﬀerent model speciﬁcations
are employed (two-way ﬁxed eﬀects models and linear dynamic panel data models). Un-
conditional quantile regressions are used in order to go beyond the mean. The analysis is
conducted using Chinese ﬁrm-level data from 2006-2015. The results suggest positive ef-
fects of gender diversity in corporate boards and patenting activities on ﬁrm performance.
Women directors are found to have statistically signiﬁcant eﬀects on both input-(positive)
and output-oriented (negative) innovation activity.
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1 Introduction
Changes in the workforce in Europe, Asia and America may increase the importance of female
representation on boards. Although women are joining the labor force in increasing numbers
around the world, they remain proportionately under-represented in the top tiers of manage-
ment (International Labour Oﬃce (ILO) Geneva, 2012). The lack of female representation on
corporate boards of directors is a global phenomenon. Women comprise less than 15% of corpo-
rate executive board members in the USA, around 7% in European countries but only around 3%
in Asian countries.1 In Europe, several countries have introduced legally-binding female board
quotas in order to ensure gender-diversity in the board room.2
Research has shown that women bringing diﬀerent perspectives and experience to the board
may have positive eﬀects on ﬁrm performance (Adler, 1997; Terjesen and Singh, 2008; Levi
et al., 2014). Moreover, gender diversity in the board room allows to gather diverse views
on problem solving, what is supposed to be particularly relevant for creative solutions such as
innovation (van Knippenberg et al., 2004). In this context, the aspect of innovation and gender-
induced diﬀerences in management has not yet been properly studied.
The eﬀects of female directors on ﬁrm performance have been particularly studied for the
USA and European countries (Adams and Ferreira, 2009; Ahern and Dittmar, 2012; Dezsö
and Ross, 2012; Matsa, Miller et al., 2013), but rarely for Asian countries (Bai et al., 2004;
Liu et al., 2014). The underlying paper considers the case of China assuming less pressure
to recruit women only due to their gender given the absence of legally-binding female board
quotas. There are also no spill-over eﬀects from neighboring countries having implemented
quotas as it might be the case in Europe. China has one of the world's highest female labor
force participation rates amounting to 63.9% in 2013 (Dasgupta et al., 2015). The latter may
be partly the heritage of the Communist Party's rule in China providing inter alia extensive
state-provided child-care. Also, China's constitution states that women are equal to men in all
areas of life. Despite these policy commitments and high labor force participation rates, women
are particularly present in traditional female occupations such as textiles and health care, while
women remain under-represented in science and technological professions for example. Recent
studies on China have pointed to the increasing gender gap in employment and wages, especially
at the higher management (for a survey see: Dasgupta et al., 2015). Another reason, why the
case of China is interesting is that corporate governance is weaker in China compared to Western
industrialized countries. This could be oﬀset  at least in parts  by more gender-diverse board
rooms given the well-known result in the literature that women are more active in monitoring
1In the respective top-101 performing ﬁrms (Government UK, 2011). MSC World using 4,218 global companies
reports the following percentages of women directors: around 12% for Paciﬁc-Asia, 12% (23% in 2015) for Europe
and 18-19% for the USA from 2014-2015 counting both independent and executive board members (MSCI ESG
Research Inc., 2015).
2Starting with Norway in 2003 and requiring 40% of board members to be women. Followed inter alia by Spain
(law passed in 2007; requiring 40% women by 2015), France (2011; 40% women on boards by 2017), Italy (2011,
at least 33% female directors by 2015) and Germany (2015; 30% female directors by 2016).
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activities (Allen et al., 2005; Gul et al., 2008; Adams and Ferreira, 2009). This suggests that,
given China's relatively weak corporate governance, gender-diverse boards may have beneﬁcial
eﬀects on ﬁrm performance due to higher monitoring activity of women (Allen et al., 2005;
Liu et al., 2014). Liu et al. (2014) considering the case of China and ﬁnd signiﬁcant positive
eﬀects of female board members on ﬁrm performance for legal person ﬁrms, while they ﬁnd an
insigniﬁcant eﬀect for state-controlled ﬁrms. The authors argue that useful insights on policy
implementations can be derived when studying gender diversity in the board room and its eﬀect
on ﬁrm performance.
Why should women in the board room have positive eﬀects on ﬁrm performance? The idea is
that more gender-diverse boards allow for diﬀerent views, knowledge and motivation (e.g. Dezsö
and Ross, 2012). On the one hand, this may increase the quality of the decision-making process.
On the other hand, too diverse groups may create communication problems and have negative
eﬀects on the quality of the decision-making process. Taste-based employer or client satisfaction
may also be negatively aﬀected by more diverse boards (Becker, 1971). Yet, discussion and
development of alternatives may help to improve both decision making and ﬁrm performance.
In line with the literature (e.g. Dezsö and Ross, 2012), given low levels of female board repre-
sentation around the world and in China, we expect that there is room for positive eﬀects of
group diversity. Indeed, Figure 5 shows that the percentage of women in the board room and the
percentage of executive female board members is increasing but still low.3 Recently, the number
is rather stagnating. In particular, the percentage of women CEOs in China is stagnating and
in the last year observed even slightly decreasing.
Why should female board representation aﬀect innovation activity of ﬁrms? The positive
eﬀects of diversity may particularly pin-down in increased innovation activity (van Knippenberg
et al., 2004). In fact, tasks requiring creative solutions may particularly beneﬁt from distinct
views and problem-solving practices. Gender-diverse board rooms fostering cooperation within
the ﬁrm can therefore have positive eﬀects on the ﬁrm's innovation activity. Therefore, we
consider not only executive but also independent and manager positions in our deﬁnition of
female board representation.
There is a broad literature providing empirical support for many diﬀerent factors that aﬀect
ﬁrm performance (e.g. Smith et al., 2006; Adams and Ferreira, 2009; Liu et al., 2014; Ahern
and Dittmar, 2012; Matsa et al., 2013). Women may self-select themselves in better performing
ﬁrms and hence female representation in a ﬁrm may endogenously depend on current ﬁrm perfor-
mance. Reverse causality may drive the positive eﬀects of women directors on ﬁrm performance
and innovation activity. Indeed, more successful ﬁrms have more resources to comply with the
principles of gender diversity in the board room. In the underlying study, besides standard
controls (discussed in detail in Section 2), in order to catch ﬁrm heterogeneity, ﬁrm-level ﬁxed
eﬀects are included in the regression analysis. Additionally, it is controlled for intertemporal
3Women directors include executive and independent board members as well as top managers.
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Figure 1: Female Board Representation by Position over Time (in %)
diﬀerences using time-varying control variables as well as year-ﬁxed eﬀects in order to control
for cyclical shocks. In order to explicitly control for potential endogeneity, reverse causality and
multicollinearity issues, several model speciﬁcations are employed. The base model consists of a
two-way ﬁxed eﬀects model controlling for ﬁrm-level heterogeneity and time eﬀects. The empir-
ical strategy is heavily based on Liu et al. (2014) that analyze the eﬀect of female directors on
Chinese ﬁrms' performance using the same data set from 1999-2011. Instead, this paper considers
the period 2006-2015 and has additional information on patenting activity of the ﬁrms. In order
to improve eﬃciency, the analysis is conducted with lagged levels as well as lagged diﬀerences, i.e.
the Blundell-Bond estimator. In order to look at diﬀerent levels of gender diversity, innovation
activity and corporate ﬁrm performance, we use Unconditional Quantile Regressions (UQRs).
In Appendix B and Appendix C alternative model (e.g. the Arellano-Bond one-step estimator)
speciﬁcations and sensitivity analysis (diﬀerent types of board position as well as ownership and
women directors) are presented.
This paper adds to the literature by analyzing whether gender diversity has eﬀects on cor-
porate ﬁrms' innovation activity. And if so, whether there are diﬀerent eﬀects for input- and
output- oriented measures of innovation activity. So far, most studies look either at output- () or
input-oriented innovation activity (Dezsö and Ross, 2012). Input-oriented innovation activity is
measured by R&D intensity, while output-oriented innovation activity is measured by patenting
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intensity. The latter measures the actual quality or productivity of innovation and is caught via
a ﬁrm's patenting intensity over time. Finally, the paper examines how this is related to ﬁrm
performance. Indeed, diﬀerent eﬀects of input- and output-oriented measures and female board
representation are found. This paper is, to the author's best knowledge, the ﬁrst investigation
on gender diversity in the board room, ﬁrm innovation activity and ﬁrm performance in China,
the world's largest developing economy. The focus on China allows to gather interesting insights
of the eﬀect of women directors and innovation activity of ﬁrms on performance without female
board legislation. Further, it is the ﬁrst paper that uses UQRs in the framework of female board
representation.
In line with the literature, the overall eﬀects of gender-diversity in corporate boards are
found to be positive for ﬁrm performance (for China, e.g. Liu et al., 2014; Chen et al., 2015). A
main ﬁnding of the study is that input- and output-oriented measures impact diﬀerently on ﬁrm
performance. In particular, the eﬀect of women directors on ﬁrm performance for ﬁrms with no
innovation activity turns statistically insigniﬁcant. Additionally, the eﬀects of independent and
executive directors, respectively, are examined. As expected, executive female directors are found
to have a stronger impact than independent female board members. The paper is organized as
follows. Section 2 describes the data. In Section 3, the estimation strategy is outlined. Section 4
discusses the empirical results and Section 5 conducts a robustness test. Section 6 concludes.
2 Data and Descriptive Statistics
The empirical estimation is based on data from the Chinese Securities Market and Accounting
Research (CSMAR) organization. The initial sample contains all listed ﬁrms in Shanghai and
Shenzhen Stock Exchanges for the period 2006-2015. The data was gathered in the odd years,
i.e. every two years, and is an unbalanced panel. We drop missing values of the variables of
interest and restrict the analysis to ﬁrms with directors that are at least 18 years old. Data on
patent information was obtained from the Chinese Patent Oﬃce in Chengdu and merged to the
data via the ﬁrm identiﬁer. The ﬁnal sample size consists of 15,871 ﬁrm-year observations.
We follow previous studies on China (e.g. Liu et al., 2014) and use Return on Assets (ROA)
and Return on Sales (ROS) as dependent variables. Given the high share of state-owned enter-
prises and the related non-tradable shares in the secondary market, Tobin's Q was not considered
an appropriate measure of a ﬁrm's ﬁnancial performance (Bai et al., 2004; Markóczy et al., 2013;
Liu et al., 2014).
As this study analyzes the eﬀect of women directors, innovation activity and ﬁrm perfor-
mance, measures of innovation activity and gender diversity in the board room are the key
variables. Following Liu et al. (2014), we use the percentage of female directors on the board
(women) as the main measure for board gender diversity. The variables considers executive and
independent board members as well as top managers. As we are interested in how a more gender
diverse management style impacts on a ﬁrm's innovation activity and performance, we do not
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restrict `women directors' or `women in the board room' to executive board members only. As
a robustness test, we repeat the analysis with dummies for diﬀerent levels of women directors
(D_1Women, D_2Women and D_3Women, for one, two or at least three female directors).
Output-oriented innovation activity is deﬁned as the ratio of the number of patents and ﬁrm
age. Input-oriented innovation activity is calculated as the ratio of R&D expenditures and one-
year lagged ﬁrm assets value. Input-oriented innovation activity is thus represented by R&D
intensity and output-oriented innovation activity by patenting intensity. Following Chen et al.
(2015) ﬁrm-years with missing R&D information are assigned a zero value. Despite employing
only an input-oriented measure (RD_int), which may fail to capture the quality of innovation,
also an output-oriented measure of registered patents (pat_int) to capture how eﬀectively a ﬁrm
has utilized its innovation input is included. RD_int and pat_int are positively correlated (see
Table 2). That is eﬀective usage has positive eﬀects on ﬁrm performance. The gender-speciﬁc
eﬀects on innovation activity are estimated via interactive eﬀects of innovation activity for both
input- and output-oriented measures and the percentage of women in the board room.
Additionally, traditional control variables including ﬁrm, board and ownership characteristics
are used. For a description of the covariates used in the analysis see Table A1 in Appendix A. The
set of covariates used extends the one in Liu et al. (2014) by the age and educational attainment
of the directors. Education is represented as the weighted grade point average (GPA). In our
case, the GPA ∈ [0, 5].4 Descriptive statistics of some of the variables used in the analysis are
shown in Table 1. On average 14% of all directors (independent, executive or top managers)
are female. and about 6% of the ﬁrms are led by a female CEO. Patenting activity amounts to
9 patents on average. Only 0.145% of total last years assets are invested in R&D. About 37%
of all directors are independent, while the rest holds either executive or management positions.
About 20% of all ﬁrms in the sample are state-owned. On average directors are 51 years old.
Table 2 shows the correlation matrix among some of the independent variables used in the
analysis.5 As a rule of thumb, a correlation of |0.7| or higher may indicate multicollinearity
issues. The correlation among the variables used in the regression is only above |0.7|, when the
variables are not used jointly in the regression or are part of a robustness or sensitivity analysis.
In order to have variables measured on the same scale, we use z-scores. That is, we subtract
the mean of the corresponding variable and divide this diﬀerence by the variable's standard
deviation. we use the standardized values throughout the empirical analysis. The coeﬃcients of
the untransformed regression do not change in sign or level of signiﬁcance (see Table 5). However,
the coeﬃcient estimates of female board representation on patenting intensity are large in the
untransformed regression. As multicollinearity is unlikely to be an issue, the large coeﬃcient
estimate may be due to diﬀerent measurement scales of the variables. Therefore, we prefer to
4Students in honors classes, AP classes, or IB classes may be graded for those courses on a 0.0 to 4.5 GPA
scale or a 0.0 to 5.0 GPA scale.
5The correlation matrix including all variables considered in the analysis (except the RIFs and ExecutiveWomen
and IndependentWomen) is shown in Table A2. For the variables not shown, multicollinearity is not an issue as
correlation is << |0.7|.
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use the transformed variables. All ﬁgures use the standardized controls.
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
Variable Obs Mean Std.Dev. Min Max
Performance Measures:
ROA 15,871 0.0417 0.0481 -0.0996 0.494
ROS 15,871 0.0876 0.186 -5.486 1.864
Board Characteristics:
women 15,871 0.140 0.132 0 0.889
D_1Women 15,871 0.358 0.480 0 1
D_2Women 15,871 0.211 0.408 0 1
D_3Women 15,871 0.131 0.338 0 1
pat_int 15,871 9.181 76.11 0 3268
RD_int 15,871 0.0015 0.021 -0.084 2.133
Independent 15,871 0.369 0.054 0.091 0.800
ExecutiveWomen 15,871 0.102 0.127 0 0.889
IndependentWomen 15,871 0.038 0.056 0 0.333
Ln_BoardSize 15,871 2.176 0.208 1.099 3.091
Duality 15,871 0.204 0.403 0 1
DirAge 15,871 50.54 3.756 18.33 65.14
DirEduc 15,871 1.730 1.571 0 4.714
Firm & Ownership Characteristics:
State 15,871 0.200 0.226 0 0.891
LegalPerson 15,871 0.171 0.204 0 0.900
Management 15,871 0.0006 0.0142 0 0.543
Ln_Shareholders 15,871 10.44 0.962 7.745 14.42
womenCEO 15,871 0.0613 0.240 0 1
Ln_FirmSize 15,871 7.623 1.392 2.197 13.22
Leverage 15,871 0.469 0.217 0.0071 1.994
Ln_FirmAge 15,871 2.571 0.434 0 3.611
Notes: The table shows the non-standardized descriptive statistics.
3 Estimation Strategy
The empirical strategy consists in ﬁrst of all analyzing the eﬀect of women directors on corporate
ﬁrm's innovation activity, both input- and output-oriented. Next, the joint eﬀect of innovation
and gender-diverse boards on ﬁrm performance is estimated. The quality or productivity of
innovation as well as expenditures in R&D are taken thereby into account.
The base model is a two-way ﬁxed eﬀects model that takes ﬁrm and time-level variation
into account. Firm-level heterogeneity is thereby assumed to be constant over time. Due to
endogeneity of female board representation, alternative model speciﬁcations are applied. In
particular, the full model is the one-step Blundell-Bond estimator. The Blundell-Bond estimator
is applied in the sense of Blundell and Bond (1998) in order to improve eﬃciency. In Appendix B,
a two-way ﬁxed eﬀects model with lagged board characteristics and lagged dependent variables
as well as the Arellano-Bond one-step estimator are applied.
As patents may start to pay-oﬀ for a ﬁrm only some time after they have been registered
and the ﬁrst products have been brought to the market. We thus assume that the eﬀect of
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output-oriented measures of innovation activity and women on the board takes some time to be
eﬀective. We therefore apply an eﬃcient dynamic panel data model that allows to account for
unobserved heterogeneity as well as dynamic relationships between the composition of the board
and past ﬁrm performance. In all models, it is controlled for heteroskedasticity by using robust
standard errors.
The Base Model
The base model used in the study is a two-way ﬁxed eﬀects model. The model is used in order
to catch the eﬀect of gender diversity on innovation activity and ﬁrm performance. Thereby it
is not only controlled for ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects but also for year ﬁxed eﬀects in order to account for
socio-economic changes over time. The base model for ﬁrm i at time t with i = 1, . . . , N and
t = 1, . . . , T reads as:
yit = α+ xitβ + ri + vt + it (1)
where yit is the corresponding dependent variable. That is either ROA or ROS as measures
for ﬁrm performance or patenting and R&D intensity as measures for innovation activity of
ﬁrm i. xit is a 1 × k vector of time- and group-variant observable characteristics and β is the
corresponding k× 1 coeﬃcient vector. The model has a three-part error structure; ri accounting
for group ﬁxed-eﬀects, i.e. for permanent diﬀerences between ﬁrms or ﬁrm eﬀects, and vt controls
for eﬀects common to all groups but variant over time, i.e. year ﬁxed eﬀects. Finally, it is an
idiosyncratic error and the constant term is measured by α.
Going beyond the Mean: UQR
In order to estimate the eﬀect of women directors on innovation activity and vice verse for dif-
ferent levels of innovation activity and women directors, respectively, we use linear UQRs (Firpo
et al., 2009). That is, we estimate the RIF. The RIF is deﬁned as:
RIF (Y ; qτ ) = qτ +
τ − 1{Y ≤ qτ}
fy(qτ )
(2)
where qτ is the value of the variable of interest, Y , at the quantile, τ . fy(qτ ) is the density of Y at
qτ . The quantile-speciﬁc two-way ﬁxed eﬀects model is then estimated by running equation (1)
with the RIF as dependent variable.6
The Full Model: Accounting for Endogeneity
Concerns about endogeneity arise from the endogeneity between the number of female directors
and ﬁrm performance since improved ﬁrm performance may lead to more women in the board
6We use the Gaussian kernel and the Silverman optimal bandwidth.
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room. Also, the traditionally low percentage of women in top management positions may allow
those women that actually made it to the top to self-select into better performing ﬁrms. Similarly,
more successful ﬁrms may be more likely to respond to social pressure of gender diversity in the
board room because of greater need for legitimacy or more resources to do so (Meyer and Rowan,
1977; Adams and Ferreira, 2009). These theories suggest that female representation in the board
room and ﬁrm performance may be driven by reverse causality. Similarly, female representation
in a ﬁrm may endogenously depend on current ﬁrm performance. Therefore, reverse causality
may drive the positive eﬀects of women directors on ﬁrm performance and innovation activity.
In order to account for these issues, we use the one-step Blundell-Bond estimator. The model
uses additional moment conditions, where variables in levels are instrumented by lagged diﬀer-
ences. The method calculates moment conditions using lagged-levels of the dependent variable as
well as the pre-determined variables with ﬁrst-diﬀerences of the disturbances. The model requires
the assumption that these diﬀerences are uncorrelated with the unobserved eﬀects (Blundell and
Bond, 1998).
All independent variables that may be inﬂuenced by a ﬁrm's policy in year t are considered
to be endogenous. That is all independent variables except the time dummies and Ln_FirmAge
are considered to be endogenous (Dezsö and Ross, 2012; Liu et al., 2014). Table 3 shows that
the Blundell-Bond one step estimator passes the Arellano-Bond test of serial autocorrelation for
AR(2). Therefore, the second to fourth lag of the endogenous and the dependent variable are
included in the regression. The Hansen test testing the null-hypothesis that the instruments
are exogenous controls for validity of the instruments used in the Arellano-Bond regression.
Our χ2 test-statistic is insigniﬁcant at a 10% level and hence, the statistic of the Hansen test
shows that the null-hypothesis that the instruments are exogenous is not rejected. The lags of
the endogenous and dependent variables from lag two up to lag four as well as all lags of the
exogenous variables are used as instruments.7 The transient error correlation is controlled for
by using only the odd years in the regression of the full model (Wintoki et al., 2012; Liu et al.,
2014).
The Blundell-Bond model accounting for unobserved heterogeneity, simultaneity and dy-
namic relationships between the composition of the board and past ﬁrm performance may be
particularly sensitive to diﬀerent eﬀects over time. As innovation activity and in particular
patenting intensity starts to pay-oﬀ after some time, the dynamic panel data model may be par-
ticularly adequate for estimation of the eﬀect of innovation activity, women directors and ﬁrm
performance.
7We include instruments from lag two of the endogenous variables as autocorrelation exists up to lag two. We
instruments up to lag four as lag ﬁve covariates show statistically insigniﬁcant coeﬃcient estimates.
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Table 3: Test of Serial Autocorrelation
(1) (2)
VARIABLES ROS ROA
Blundell-Bond Estimator
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) z = 1.13 Prob > z = 0.258 z =1.32 Prob > z = 0.188
Hansen test χ2 (df) 3.28 (9) Prob > χ2= 0.952 13.49 (9) Prob > χ2=0.142
4 Estimation Results
In this Section, the eﬀects of women directors on innovation activity as well as on ﬁrm perfor-
mance are discussed. For a discussion of the eﬀects of diﬀerent types of board members and legal
or state-ownership on ﬁrm performance and female directors see Appendix C.
As we use z-scores, we obtain the eﬀect of women directors at corporate ﬁrms' average
innovation activity on ﬁrm performance.
Female Board Members and Innovation Activity
In order to test, whether women in the board room positively aﬀect ﬁrm's innovation activity,
we look, ﬁrst, at the eﬀect of the percentage of women directors on the innovation activity
controls. Second, we regress innovation controls on the percentage of female board members.
In both settings, we include the set of covariates controlling for board, ﬁrm and ownership
characteristics.
Table 4 shows that R&D and patenting intensity are not aﬀected by gender-diversity on
average. This holds for the base as well as for the full model. Patenting activity is at no level
aﬀected by female directors. That is gender diversity in the board room has no statistically
signiﬁcant eﬀect on RD_int or pat_int. The system-estimator conﬁrms this ﬁnding.
Using a UQR model reveals that only high innovative active ﬁrms are aﬀected by gen-
der diverse board rooms. Therefore, we run a regression of RIF (pat_int; qτ ) on women and
RIF (RD_int; qτ ) on women, respectively. The conﬁdence intervals are bootstrapped (250 repli-
cations). Figure 2 shows that ﬁrms that are barely engaged in innovation activity both patenting
(Women_Pat) and R&D (Women_RD) are not aﬀected by women directors. Contrary, for high-
innovative ﬁrms, gender diverse boards become eﬀective. Women directors impact positively on
patenting intensity but negatively on R&D intensity.
More innovative ﬁrms are more likely to have women at the top (see Figure 3). The coeﬃcient
estimates are obtained from separate regressions of pat_int and RD_int on the percentage of
women directors in a ﬁrm using UQRs. This eﬀect is most pronounced at the 30th quantile of the
distribution of women directors. Other levels of gender diversity are not aﬀected by patenting
or R&D activity of a ﬁrm. These results suggest that there are signiﬁcant eﬀects of innovation
activity on gender-diversity and that the eﬀect of both input- and output-oriented innovation
activity impact similar at the 30th quantile on women directors. Hence, the level of women
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directors is important. Therefore, we analyze in Section 5, for robustness, diﬀerent levels of
women directors on innovation activity as well as on ﬁrm performance.
Table 4: Eﬀect of Women Directors on Innovation Activity
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Base Model Full Model Base Model Full Model
VARIABLES RD_int RD_int pat_int pat_int
women 0.0138 0.0118 0.0046 0.0445
(0.012) (0.014) (0.004) (0.045)
DirAge -0.0218 0.0247 0.0187 0.0433
(0.021) (0.031) (0.013) (0.039)
DirEduc -0.0105 -0.0047 0.0031 -0.0699
(0.011) (0.019) (0.007) (0.053)
Independent 0.0004 0.0021 -0.0005 0.0185
(0.013) (0.015) (0.008) (0.024)
Ln_BoardSize -0.0056 -0.0123 0.0014 0.0338
(0.013) (0.011) (0.010) (0.045)
Duality 0.0164 -0.0077 -0.0003 0.0311
(0.015) (0.011) (0.005) (0.046)
State -0.0249 -0.0144 -0.0221 -0.0728
(0.066) (0.027) (0.013) (0.077)
LegalPerson 0.0553 -0.0439 -0.0063 -0.0258
(0.044) (0.033) (0.006) (0.049)
Management -0.0069 -0.0032 -0.0012 0.0461*
(0.008) (0.005) (0.001) (0.026)
Ln_Shareholders -0.0422*** -0.0509* 0.0297 0.1313
(0.014) (0.030) (0.030) (0.119)
womenCEO 0.0059 -0.0050 0.0005 0.0126
(0.009) (0.008) (0.002) (0.018)
Ln_FirmSize -0.0186 0.0192 -0.0045 0.1024
(0.022) (0.016) (0.011) (0.082)
Leverage -0.0089 -0.0081 0.0055 0.0631
(0.013) (0.020) (0.006) (0.039)
Ln_FirmAge 0.0014 -0.0137 0.0403 -0.1041***
(0.032) (0.009) (0.027) (0.036)
Year Fixed Eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm Fixed Eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 15,871 15,871 2,792 15,871
R-squared 0.004 0.017
Number of ﬁrms 2,653 1,204 2,653 1,204
Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
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Figure 2: The Eﬀect of Women Directors on Innovation Activity, UQR
Figure 3: The Eﬀect of Innovation Activity on Women Directors, UQR
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The Eﬀect on Firm Performance
Before looking at the eﬀect of female board representation and innovation activity, both income-
and output-oriented, we test whether the data delivers the same result as obtained by Liu et al.
(2014). That is positive eﬀects of women directors on corporate ﬁrm performance. Table 5
shows that using the same set of covariates, the eﬀect of female directors on ﬁrm performance
is statistically signiﬁcant and positive also in the period 2006-2015 in China. The result holds
for both ROA and ROS as dependent variable and for the transformed regressions, column (2)
and (4), as well as for the untransformed regressions, column (1) and (3).8 A one percent
increase in women increases ROS and ROA by 0.036% and 0.01%, respectively. In the case of
the standardized variables, we ﬁnd that a one percent increase in women increases average ROS
and average ROA each by 0.026%.
The estimation outcome of the base and full described in Section 3 with ROS and ROA as
dependent variables and augmented by a ﬁrm's innovation activity and gender board diversity are
shown in Table 6. The coeﬃcient estimate of women represents the eﬀect of gender-diversity in
the board room on ﬁrm performance that is not related to innovation. The percentage of women
in the board room impacts positively on corporate ﬁrm performance. In the alternative two-
way ﬁxed eﬀects speciﬁcation, the coeﬃcient estimate is similar in magnitude (see AppendixB,
Table B.1 and Table B.2). In the eﬃcient dynamic panel data model, taking-away the innovative
component, female board representation impacts negatively, though statistically insigniﬁcant, on
ﬁrm performance. This result is in line with other studies in the literature that consider the eﬀect
of women at the top and input-oriented innovation activity on ﬁrm performance (e.g. Dezsö and
Ross, 2012). In the Arellano-Bond model, i.e. the alternative dynamic panel data model, the
eﬀect of women in ﬁrms with no innovation activity is again zero. R&D intensity in ﬁrms with
women directors (RD_fem) impacts statistically signiﬁcantly on ﬁrm performance only in the
base model. The negative coeﬃcient estimate of RD_int suggests that in ﬁrms with no women
directors, increased R&D intensity in year t lowers ROA in the same year. Contrary, in ﬁrms
with female board representation, ROS and ROA are aﬀected positively. Using the one-step
Blundell-Bond estimator turns the sign of RD_fem. Firms with a gender-diverse management
and increases in RD_int in previous periods lowers a ﬁrm's ROA today.
Patenting intensity has no statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect on ﬁrm performance in ﬁrms with no
gender diversity in the board room. However, past output-oriented innovation activity increases
ROA in the current period. Positive patenting activity in ﬁrms with female directors in the past
increases thus both ROS and ROA today. In the dynamic system GMM model, the output-
oriented measures turns statistically signiﬁcant and positive. This suggests that controlling for
endogeneity, only output-oriented ﬁrm performance in combination with gender-group diversity
in the broad room positively and statistically signiﬁcantly aﬀects ﬁrm performance. Firms with
zero innovation activity experience no eﬀect of female board representation on both ROS and
8Liu et al. (2014) conduct untransformed regressions.
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ROA. Hence, female board representation is particularly attractive for ﬁrms with focus on in-
novation and in this case can oﬀer strategic advantages. The negative eﬀect of RD_fem in the
dynamic panel data model underpins that ﬁrms have to invest ﬁrst in R&D before earning a
positive premium from innovation.
Patenting activity and R&D intensity have no joint impact on a ﬁrm's performance, what is,
what we expect from Table 2.9 The other covariates impact as expected.
Table 5: The Eﬀect of Female Board Representation on ROA and ROS, with standardized and
non-standardized variables
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Base Model
ROS ROS ROA ROA
Not Standardized Standardized Not Standardized Standardized
VARIABLES ROS ROS ROA ROA
women 0.036** 0.026** 0.010** 0.026**
(0.017599) (0.012489) (0.004840) (0.013307)
Independent 0.001 0.0001 -0.003 -0.004
(0.042463) (0.012337) (0.011153) (0.012556)
Ln_BoardSize 0.017 0.019 0.005 0.023
(0.015380) (0.017202) (0.004731) (0.020505)
Duality -0.002 -0.005 0.001 0.009
(0.008615) (0.018629) (0.001508) (0.012632)
State 0.061* 0.074* 0.026** 0.122**
(0.037008) (0.044903) (0.010351) (0.048665)
LegalPerson 0.172*** 0.188*** 0.050*** 0.210***
(0.038632) (0.042276) (0.010391) (0.044063)
Management 0.062 0.005 0.030 0.009
(0.054960) (0.004188) (0.021013) (0.006204)
Ln_Shareholders -0.016*** -0.081*** -0.009*** -0.185***
(0.004327) (0.022338) (0.001075) (0.021493)
womenCEO 0.009 0.011 0.001 0.005
(0.012643) (0.016274) (0.002598) (0.012957)
Ln_FirmSize 0.002 0.018 0.003*** 0.083***
(0.005132) (0.038324) (0.001079) (0.031226)
Leverage -0.165*** -0.193*** -0.077*** -0.348***
(0.025487) (0.029743) (0.006138) (0.027754)
Ln_FirmAge 0.014 0.032 -0.001 -0.011
(0.017016) (0.039618) (0.004632) (0.041788)
Firm Fixed Eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 15,871 15,871 15,871 15,871
R-squared 0.027 0.027 0.113 0.113
Number of ﬁrms 2,653 2,653 2,653 2,653
Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
9The correlation between the two variables is almost zero: 0.002.
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Table 6: Eﬀect of Women Directors and Innovation Activity on Firm Performance
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Base Model Full Model Base Model Full Model
VARIABLES ROS ROS ROA ROA
women 0.0259** -0.0195 0.0258* -0.0131
(0.012) (0.038) (0.013) (0.027)
pat_int 0.0093 0.0125 -0.0119 0.0238*
(0.007) (0.012) (0.014) (0.013)
pat_fem 0.0044 0.0559** 0.0005 0.0483*
(0.009) (0.022) (0.020) (0.025)
RD_fem 0.0107* -0.0871 0.0238*** -0.1249**
(0.006) (0.065) (0.008) (0.063)
RD_int -0.0081 -0.0132 -0.0209* 0.0400
(0.010) (0.058) (0.012) (0.072)
pat_RD 0.0066 -0.0006 0.0072 -0.0045
(0.008) (0.006) (0.018) (0.008)
DirAge 0.0130 0.0520 0.0043 0.0274
(0.017) (0.073) (0.016) (0.047)
DirEduc -0.0136 -0.0393 -0.0121 -0.0664*
(0.020) (0.050) (0.017) (0.037)
Independent -0.0010 0.0528 -0.0050 0.0155
(0.012) (0.053) (0.013) (0.031)
Ln_BoardSize 0.0192 0.0872* 0.0233 0.0330
(0.017) (0.049) (0.020) (0.039)
Duality -0.0043 -0.1108 0.0101 0.0235
(0.019) (0.097) (0.013) (0.038)
State 0.0722 -0.0228 0.1192** 0.0238
(0.045) (0.078) (0.048) (0.052)
LegalPerson 0.1881*** 0.1042 0.2094*** 0.1165**
(0.042) (0.070) (0.044) (0.056)
Management 0.0045 0.0080 0.0083 0.0341**
(0.004) (0.022) (0.006) (0.015)
Ln_Shareholders -0.0829*** -0.0168 -0.1851*** -0.1258***
(0.023) (0.055) (0.022) (0.046)
womenCEO 0.0112 -0.0186 0.0049 -0.0188
(0.016) (0.028) (0.013) (0.025)
Ln_FirmSize 0.0168 0.0714 0.0821*** 0.1039**
(0.038) (0.099) (0.031) (0.043)
Leverage -0.1929*** -0.0855* -0.3479*** -0.1266***
(0.030) (0.045) (0.028) (0.041)
Ln_FirmAge 0.0291 0.0380 -0.0134 0.0576**
(0.039) (0.030) (0.042) (0.024)
Year Fixed Eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm Fixed Eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 15,871 2,792 15,871 2,792
R-squared 0.027 0.113
Number of ﬁrms 2,653 1,204 2,653 1,204
Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
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Figure 4: Eﬀect of Female Board Representation on ROS, UQR
Figure 5: Eﬀect of Female Board Representation on ROA, UQR
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5 Robustness Test: The Level of Gender-Board Diversity
Diﬀerent levels of gender-diversity may have diﬀerent eﬀects on ﬁrm performance. Therefore, we
repeat the analysis in Section 4 by using dummies for the number of women directors interacted
with the innovation activity controls. We use the number of female directors on the board as the
measures for board gender diversity following the literature on the critical mass theory. That
is D_1Women, D_2Women, D_3Women; measuring whether at least one woman, two or three
women are present in the board room, respectively. The critical mass theory states that a `critical
mass' of female directors needs to be reached before women directors have an inﬂuence on a ﬁrm's
performance (Simpson et al., 2010).
The eﬀect of diﬀerent levels of female directors on innovation activity is represented in Ta-
ble 7. The eﬀect of diﬀerent amounts of female directors on innovation activity, both input- and
output-oriented, is positive. However, the gender diversity does impact statistically signiﬁcant
on patenting intensity only for a minimum of three women directors. This suggests that a `criti-
cal mass' is needed in order for gender diversity to have (positive) eﬀects on patenting intensity
in China. For ﬁrms with high innovation activity, no statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect of diﬀerent
levels of female board representation on patenting or R&D activity is found. Similarly, using the
Blundell-Bond one-step estimator, no statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect is found.
Table 8 shows the eﬀect of innovation activity and female board representation on ROS and
ROA, respectively. The full model speciﬁcation with ROS and ROA, respectively, pass both
the Arellano-Bond test of second order autocorrelation and the Hansen test of exogeneity of
the instruments (see Table 9). For ROA as dependent variables, the latter holds only at a 5%
level. In line with the `critical mass' theory stating that a certain number of female directors is
needed in order for women directors to have a signiﬁcant eﬀect on ﬁrm performance, it is found
that two or more women directors in ﬁrms with R&D activity are needed in order to have a
statistically signiﬁcant and positive on ROA. Higher levels of women in the board room in ﬁrms
with non-zero R&D activity impact negatively and statistically signiﬁcant on both ROS and
ROA in the full model. The negative coeﬃcient estimate of RD_3Women in the full model is
in line with the results in Section 4. More gender-diverse boards trigger R&D expenditures in
previous periods, what impacts negatively on current ﬁrm performance. More female directors in
ﬁrms with non-zero patenting activity have positive and statistically signiﬁcant eﬀects on both
ROS and ROA in the linear dynamic panel data model. Again the results form Section 4 are
conﬁrmed. However, we gain the additional insight that at least three women are needed in order
to provide these eﬀects.
These results underline that there are opposing eﬀects of gender diversity in the board room
and input- and output-oriented innovative ﬁrm on ﬁrm performance. We ﬁnd positive and
signiﬁcant eﬀects in the latter case and negative eﬀects in the previous case. In particular, it
is important to account for endogeneity due to reverse causality of current board composition,
innovation activity and ﬁrm performance.
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Table 7: Number of Women in the Board Room and Innovation Activity
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Base Model Full Model Base Model Full Model
VARIABLES RD_int RD_int pat_int pat_int
D_1Women 0.0069 -0.0040 0.0260 0.1608
(0.012) (0.014) (0.018) (0.163)
D_2Women 0.0048 0.0095 0.0174 0.1240
(0.011) (0.014) (0.011) (0.108)
D_3Women 0.0107 0.0070 0.0153* 0.0364
(0.009) (0.012) (0.009) (0.046)
DirAge -0.0225 -0.0133 0.0185 -0.0754
(0.022) (0.013) (0.013) (0.108)
DirEduc -0.0114 0.0221 0.0023 0.0344
(0.011) (0.031) (0.007) (0.039)
Independent 0.0005 -0.0003 -0.0005 -0.0901
(0.013) (0.018) (0.008) (0.077)
Ln_BoardSize -0.0080 0.0048 -0.0005 0.0428
(0.013) (0.016) (0.009) (0.032)
Duality 0.0164 -0.0123 -0.0003 0.0750
(0.015) (0.011) (0.005) (0.085)
State -0.0250 -0.0085 -0.0222 0.0563
(0.066) (0.011) (0.014) (0.048)
LegalPerson 0.0553 -0.0237 -0.0063 -0.1142
(0.044) (0.024) (0.006) (0.115)
Management -0.0069 -0.0454 -0.0010 -0.0066
(0.008) (0.035) (0.001) (0.053)
Ln_Shareholders -0.0419*** -0.0059 0.0300 0.0366**
(0.014) (0.005) (0.030) (0.018)
womenCEO 0.0063 -0.0546* -0.0009 0.1081
(0.009) (0.030) (0.002) (0.100)
Ln_FirmSize -0.0188 -0.0032 -0.0040 -0.0076
(0.022) (0.008) (0.011) (0.020)
Leverage -0.0090 0.0191 0.0056 0.1046
(0.013) (0.016) (0.006) (0.082)
Ln_FirmAge 0.0009 -0.0041 0.0395 0.0552
(0.032) (0.018) (0.027) (0.039)
Year Fixed Eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm Fixed Eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 15,871 2,792 15,871 2,792
R-squared 0.004 0.019
Number of ﬁrms 2,653 1,204 2,653 1,204
Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
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Table 8: Number of Women Directors, Innovation Activity and Corporate Firm Performance
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Base Model Full Model Base Model Full Model
VARIABLES ROS ROS ROA ROA
RD_int -0.0030 0.0603 -0.0264 0.0165
(0.015) (0.086) (0.016) (0.077)
D_1Women 0.0121 0.0050 -0.0078 0.0106
(0.012) (0.036) (0.012) (0.000)
RD_1Women 0.0004 -0.1276 0.0267 -0.1059
(0.010) (0.113) (0.021) (0.096)
D_2Women 0.0111 -0.0436 0.0064 -0.0518*
(0.013) (0.075) (0.012) (0.031)
RD_2Women 0.0077 -0.0492 0.0328** -0.1602
(0.008) (0.097) (0.016) (0.097)
D_3Women 0.0161 0.0129 0.0174 0.0121
(0.012) (0.030) (0.014) (0.027)
RD_3Women 0.0165 -0.1308* 0.0138 -0.1419**
(0.019) (0.078) (0.016) (0.071)
pat_int 0.0190 -0.0222 -0.0141 0.0253
(0.012) (0.022) (0.026) (0.017)
pat_1Women -0.0055 0.0424 0.0046 0.0087
(0.007) (0.028) (0.014) (0.016)
pat_2Women 0.0040 0.0322 0.0123 0.0306
(0.008) (0.028) (0.016) (0.023)
pat_3Women 0.0035 0.0832* 0.0026 0.0627*
(0.008) (0.045) (0.019) (0.035)
DirAge 0.0116 0.0496 0.0041 0.0287
(0.017) (0.059) (0.016) (0.043)
DirEduc -0.0153 -0.0389 -0.0120 -0.0729**
(0.020) (0.043) (0.017) (0.034)
Independent -0.0006 0.0536 -0.0049 0.0174
(0.012) (0.046) (0.013) (0.029)
Ln_BoardSize 0.0149 0.0716* 0.0182 0.0356
(0.017) (0.043) (0.020) (0.037)
Duality -0.0041 -0.0922 0.0096 0.0156
(0.019) (0.082) (0.013) (0.036)
State 0.0720 0.0172 0.1200** 0.0454
(0.045) (0.060) (0.048) (0.051)
LegalPerson 0.1891*** 0.0814 0.2096*** 0.1262**
(0.042) (0.063) (0.044) (0.051)
Management 0.0047 0.0030 0.0081 0.0428***
(0.004) (0.019) (0.006) (0.013)
Ln_Shareholders -0.0821*** 0.0087 -0.1852*** -0.1362***
(0.023) (0.048) (0.022) (0.046)
womenCEO 0.0120 -0.0002 0.0062 -0.0222
(0.016) (0.027) (0.013) (0.023)
Ln_FirmSize 0.0158 0.0876 0.0808*** 0.1194***
(0.038) (0.085) (0.031) (0.043)
Leverage -0.1929*** -0.1040** -0.3478*** -0.1555***
(0.030) (0.045) (0.028) (0.040)
Ln_FirmAge 0.0282 0.0377 -0.0124 0.0605***
(0.039) (0.030) (0.042) (0.023)
Year Fixed Eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm Fixed Eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 15,871 2,792 15,871 2,792
R-squared 0.027 0.114
Number of ﬁrms 2,653 1,204 2,653 1,204
Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
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Table 9: Test of Serial Autocorrelation
(1) (2)
VARIABLES ROS ROA
Blundell-Bond Estimator
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) z = 1.12 Prob > z = 0.262 z =1.30 Prob > z = 0.192
Hansen test χ2 (df) 2.95 (9) Prob > χ2= 0.966 16.62 (9) Prob > χ2=0.055
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6 Conclusion
This paper elaborates whether women bringing their diversity, cross-cultural awareness and lead-
ership skills to the boards oﬀer strategic advantages for ﬁrms (Adler, 1997; Terjesen and Singh,
2008). The study provides evidence of positive eﬀects of gender-diverse boards and output-
oriented innovation activity on ﬁrm performance in China. It adds to the empirical literature on
the impact of female board representation on corporate ﬁrm performance (BarNir, 2012; Dezsö
and Ross, 2012). The focus on China allows a more precise distinction of the eﬀectiveness of
gender-diverse boards given the absence of legally-induced female board rules. Mandatory fe-
male board quotas may result in more heterogeneous boards in terms of experience and age of
its members (Ahern and Dittmar, 2012) as well as in an insuﬃcient number of qualiﬁed female
employees for recruitment in the board (Smith et al., 2006). This may result in ineﬃcient boards
due to legally-imposed board rules (Bøhren and Staubo, 2014).
The base speciﬁcation is the two-way ﬁxed eﬀects model allowing to control for both ﬁrm and
year ﬁxed eﬀects. We use UQRs to reveal potential diﬀerences in the eﬀect of female directors,
innovation activity and ﬁrm performance at diﬀerent points of the corresponding distribution.
In order to account for autocorrelation issues, the Blundell-Bond one-step estimator is used.
The Arellano-Bond test for second order autocorrelation as well as the Hansen test control for
validity of the instruments used. We look at the eﬀect of women directors on corporate ﬁrm's
innovation activity as well as on performance. In particular, the analysis accounts for both input-
and output-oriented measures of innovation activity.
Women are found to have a positive impact on patenting intensity, while negative eﬀects
of female board members on input-oriented innovation are found. This holds for highly active
ﬁrms in innovation activity. Corollary, we ﬁnd negative eﬀects of past years R&D intensity on
current ﬁrm performance and positive eﬀects of past patenting intensity in ﬁrms with female
directors, respectively. This suggests that output-oriented measures of innovation activity such
as patenting intensity and women on the board may take some time to become eﬀective and
hence are detected in the linear dynamic panel but not in the baseline model. The dynamic
Blundell-Bond model allows to catch the eﬀect of women directors and patenting intensity on ﬁrm
performance as it accounts for unobserved heterogeneity, simultaneity and dynamic relationships
between the composition of the board and past ﬁrm performance. Using diﬀerent levels of women
directors as measures for female board representation, we ﬁnd that a critical mass of three or
more female directors. In the base model, the eﬀect of gender-diverse management and patenting
activity is not statistically signiﬁcant. Contrary, R&D intensity in ﬁrms with women directors
impacts positively on ROS and ROA in the base model. This shows that it is important to take
endogeneity issues into account.
All in all, positive eﬀects of female directors and output-oriented innovation activity on
ﬁrm performance are found. More women on the board are found to have positive eﬀects on
performance of Chinese ﬁrms. Hence, more gender-diverse boards today may oﬀer strategic
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advantages for ﬁrms in terms of output-oriented innovation activity and ﬁrm performance. To
the author's best knowledge, this is the ﬁrst study that establishes such a relationship for China.
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Appendix
A Deﬁnition and Correlation of Variables
Table A1: Deﬁnition of Variables
Variable Name Deﬁnition
Dependent Variables
Firm Performance
ROA Return on assets; net income divided by total assets (measured in percent)
ROS Return on sales; net income divided by total sales (measured in percent)
Tobin_Q Tobin's Q is deﬁned as the market value of a ﬁrm in a respective year
divided by the ﬁrm's total assets in that year
RIF_XXq RIF function of XX at quantile q, with XX ∈ [RD, pat,ROS,ROA] and q ∈ [5, 90]
Independent Variables
Gender Diversity Measures
Women The percentage of women on the board
D_1Women One if one woman on the board, zero otherwise
D_2Women One if two women on the board, zero otherwise
D_3Women One if at least three women on the board, zero otherwise
Innovative Activity Measures
RD_int R&D intensity; R&D expenditure divided by ﬁrm's total sales from last year
RD_fem Interactive eﬀect of RD_int & women
pat_int Patent intensity; number of patents registered since a ﬁrm's existence divided by
the age of the ﬁrm
pat_fem Interactive eﬀect of pat_int & women
pat_RD Interactive eﬀect of pat_int & RD_int
pat_XWomen Interactive eﬀect of pat_int & D_XWomen, with X = 1, 2, 3
RD_XWomen Interactive eﬀect of RD_int & D_XWomen, with X = 1, 2, 3
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Board Characteristics
Independent The percentage of independent board directors
IndependentWomen The percentage of female independent board directors
ExecutiveWomen The percentage of female executive board directors
Ln_BoardSize Natural logarithm of the size of the board
Duality One if CEO and board chair are held by the same person, zero otherwise
DirAge Age of the directors in years
DirEduc GPA of the directors
Ownership Characteristics
State The percentage of shares owned by the government
LegalPerson The percentage of shares owned by foreign and domestic legal persons
Management The percentage of shares owned by the ﬁrm management
womstat Interactive eﬀect State times Women_%
womlegal Interactive eﬀect LegalPerson times Women_%
Ln_Shareholders Natural logarithm of the number of shareholders
Firm Characteristics
womenCEO One if the CEO is female, zero otherwise
Ln_FirmSize Natural logarithm of the number of employees
Leverage Book value of debt divided by total assets of a ﬁrm
Ln_FirmAge Natural logarithm of the ﬁrm age in years
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B Alternative Model Speciﬁcations
As alternatives to the above discussed base and full model, we use use lagged board and inno-
vation controls and lagged ﬁrm performance as additional regressors in the two-way ﬁxed eﬀects
model. This should eliminate the positive association between female representation and ﬁrm
performance. Additionally, the Arellano-Bond one-step estimator is applied. This dynamic panel
estimator controls for endogeneity deriving from unobserved heterogeneity, reverse causality and
dynamic relation between the composition of the board and past ﬁrm performance (Arellano and
Bond, 1991).
The Arellano-Bond test is satisfactory since there is no autocorrelation of second order (see
Table B.3). The χ2 test-statistic is insigniﬁcant at a 10% level and hence, the statistic of the
Hansen test shows that the null-hypothesis that the instruments are exogenous is not rejected.
Again, only the odd years are used in the regression. All lags of the exogenous variables up to
lag four are included in the regression, while the regression is augmented by lags two to four of
the endogenous variables and the dependent variable.
Table B.1 and Table B.2 show the estimation outcome of the alternative speciﬁcations on
ROS and ROA, respectively. In terms of economic signiﬁcance, the coeﬃcient estimates are
similar to the base model. Statistically, the eﬀects are signiﬁcant only in the model in column(2)
on ROS.
Table B.1: Eﬀect on ROS, Alternative Model Speciﬁcations
(1) (2) (3)
Two-way Fixed Eﬀects Arellano-Bond
Lagged Board Char. Lagged Board Char. + Lagged Dep. Var.
VARIABLES ROS ROS ROS
women 0.0281 0.0317* -0.0997
(0.019) (0.019) (0.12274)
pat_int 0.0041 0.0042 0.0974
(0.007) (0.007) (0.08267)
pat_fem 0.0031 0.0031 0.0331
(0.011) (0.011) (0.04371)
RD_fem 0.0028 0.0033 0.1599
(0.005) (0.005) (0.14948)
RD_int -0.0020 -0.0030 -0.0247
(0.018) (0.019) (0.07856)
pat_RD 0.0242 0.0213 0.0158
(0.031) (0.030) (0.01142)
Year Fixed Eﬀects Yes Yes Yes
Firm Fixed Eﬀects Yes Yes Yes
Board, Firm & Ownership Covariates Yes Yes Yes
Observations 12,302 12,302 1,794
R-squared 0.035 0.040
Number of ﬁrms 2,478 2,478 1,059
Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
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Table B.2: Eﬀect on ROA, Alternative Model Speciﬁcations
(1) (2) (3)
Two-way Fixed Eﬀects Arellano-Bond
Lagged Board Char. Lagged Board Char. + Lagged Dep. Var.
VARIABLES ROA ROA ROA
women 0.0257 0.0245 -0.1186
(0.016) (0.015) (0.07749)
pat_int -0.0179 -0.0147 -0.0015
(0.015) (0.014) (0.11929)
pat_fem 0.0005 -0.0008 -0.0315
(0.023) (0.021) (0.06146)
RD_fem 0.0045 0.0009 0.0520
(0.007) (0.006) (0.17173)
RD_int 0.0030 0.0012 0.0707
(0.023) (0.020) (0.07022)
pat_RD 0.0731 0.0554 -0.0090
(0.077) (0.067) (0.00647)
Year Fixed Eﬀects Yes Yes Yes
Firm Fixed Eﬀects Yes Yes Yes
Board, Firm & Ownership Covariates Yes Yes Yes
Observations 12,302 12,302 1,794
R-squared 0.120 0.143
Number of ﬁrms 2,478 2,478 1,059
Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
Table B.3: Test of Serial Autocorrelation
(1) (2)
VARIABLES ROS ROA
Arellano-Bond Estimator
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) z = 0.58 Prob > z = 0.560 z =1.32 Prob > z = 0.188
Hansen test χ2 (df) 0.48 (6) Prob > χ2= 0.998 1.31 (6) Prob > χ2=0.971
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C Sensitivity Analysis
In this Section, we brieﬂy look at the eﬀect of diﬀerent board positions on ﬁrm performance. Fur-
ther, we analyze the eﬀect of ﬁrm ownership on female directors and corporate ﬁrm performance.
For a more thorough discussion of the eﬀects see Liu et al. (2014).
Independent and Executive Board Members
It is important to distinguish between the eﬀects of independent and executive board members.
Independent directors are more likely to inﬂuence the ﬁrm via monitoring activities, while exec-
utive directors inﬂuence the ﬁrm's performance via their leadership and management skills. In
line with the literature, we ﬁnd more pronounced eﬀects of female executive directors than inde-
pendent female board members on ﬁrm performance (see e.g. Liu et al., 2014, that also consider
the case of China). Executive female directors have a statistically signiﬁcant and positive eﬀect
on ﬁrm performance (see Table B.4). The eﬀect is economically always higher for executive than
for independent female directors and the latter is never statistically signiﬁcant. A female CEO
is found to have no statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect on ﬁrm performance.
Table B.4: Independent versus Executive Women Directors on Firm Performance
(1) (2)
VARIABLES ROS ROA
ExecutiveWomen 0.0257* 0.0235*
(0.014) (0.014)
IndependentWomen 0.0116 0.0135
(0.009) (0.011)
Independent -0.0036 -0.0080
(0.013) (0.012)
Year Fixed Eﬀects Yes Yes
Firm Fixed Eﬀects Yes Yes
Observations 15,871 15,871
R-squared 0.010 0.045
Number of ﬁrm 2,653 2,653
Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
Firm Ownership and Female Board Representation
In Table B.5, the eﬀect of diﬀerent types of ﬁrm ownership on female board representation and
ﬁrm performance is shown. Using the percentage of female board members as dependent variable,
Neither state nor legal ownership have a statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect on the presence of women
on the board. Women in state-owned enterprises have a statistically signiﬁcant and negative
eﬀect on ﬁrm performance (womstat). For female board members in ﬁrms with legal-person
ownership (womlegal), the eﬀect is statistically insigniﬁcant.
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Table B.5: Ownership and Board Gender Diversity
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES women ROS ROA
women 0.0832** 0.0327
(0.036) (0.033)
State -0.0552 0.1209*** 0.1580***
(0.036) (0.045) (0.054)
womstat -0.0576** -0.0241
(0.025) (0.029)
LegalPerson 0.0060 0.2455*** 0.2634***
(0.032) (0.048) (0.047)
womlegal -0.0559 0.0137
(0.037) (0.039)
Year Fixed Eﬀects Yes Yes Yes
Firm Fixed Eﬀects Yes Yes Yes
Observations 15,871 15,871 15,871
R-squared 0.051 0.015 0.055
Number of ﬁrm 2,653 2,653 2,653
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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